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Abstract
Recent studies have demonstrated the potency of gov-
ernment branding to enhance citizens' trust in govern-
ment organizations and policies. In addition, studies have
pointed to the detrimental implications of this emotive
effect, mainly its ability to compensate for organizations'
poor functioning, and accordingly to elicit undue trust. In
light of these concerns, this study explores the bound-
aries of governments' persuasion of citizens through
branding and symbolic communications. Building on
social psychology and marketing research, I hypothesize
that citizens are less susceptible to persuasion by brand-
ing the more they perceive the policy issue as personally
relevant. I test this expectation through a survey experi-
ment, focused on air pollution policy in Israel, exploiting
the natural variation in the perceived personal relevance
between citizens residing in a polluted area in the coun-
try and others. The results indicate that even high levels
of perceived personal relevance do not attenuate the
effect of symbolic brand elements. This means that the
boundaries of persuasion and manipulation through
branding are wider than expected.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Public administration scholarship has shown a growing interest in public sector branding and its potency to influence
citizens' perceptions and direct their behaviour (Eshuis and Klijn 2012; Sataøen and Wæraas 2015; Marland et al.
2017). Congruently, recent empirical studies established that symbolic brand elements entangled in government
communications (e.g., agency names, logos, colours and figures) can have a positive emotional effect on citizens,
which leads them to view public organizations and their policies and services more favourably (Marvel 2015b; Karens
et al. 2016; Alon-Barkat and Gilad 2017; Teodoro and An 2018; Alon-Barkat 2019). This growing scholarly interest
corresponds with the overall increase in the use of branding practices by public sector organizations over the past
decade or so, in part due to the expansion of digital communication and social media (Mergel and Bretschneider
2013; Mickoleit 2014).
The ability of government organizations to modify citizens' attitudes via such symbolic communications can be
perceived favourably, in so far as it mitigates citizens' distrust in organizations and undervaluation of their perfor-
mance. Accordingly, symbolic communications, as opposed to the delivery of mere factual information and substan-
tive arguments, may enable organizations to overcome citizens' negative prior beliefs and biases against the public
sector (Marvel 2015a, 2015b; Hvidman and Andersen 2016; Hvidman 2019). Nonetheless, this form of persuasion is
also highly problematic. Normatively, we expect citizens in a democratic society to form their opinions about their
government based on critical thinking, rather than on unconscious emotive responses. A yet more serious concern
regards the potency of government branding to compensate for organizations' poor performance, poorly planned
policies and logically unpersuasive explanations, as indicated by previous studies (Alon-Barkat and Gilad 2017; Alon-
Barkat 2019). Congruently, it can yield a misalignment between citizens' positive view and the ‘real world’, which
would undermine governments' democratic accountability and responsiveness. Moreover, government agencies
and/or politicians controlling them could exploit branding as an instrument of propaganda, and seek to manipulate
public opinion and mitigate justified public criticism of agencies' failures.
The above-mentioned concerns about the negative implications of branding for democracy are the main motiva-
tion of this study. These concerns necessitate a better theoretical understanding of the boundaries of governments'
persuasion (and possibly manipulation) of citizens through branding, which would enable us to assess more effec-
tively the scope of the risk that these practices pose for democracy. In line with this motivation, this study focuses
on an important potential limitation that regards the perceived personal relevance of the policy issue. I explore
whether the effect of symbolic brand elements in communications is restricted to policy issues that are not per-
ceived by citizens as having a significant consequence for their personal lives, or rather that citizens are similarly sus-
ceptible to persuasion via branding even with regard to such personally relevant issues. This moderating factor is
particularly important, since we tend to expect these affected groups to pay more attention to government actions
that concern their interests and to hold them to account for their consequences to a greater extent. That expectation
can be supported, theoretically, by the social psychology Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).
The model postulates that the more people perceive the communication as personally relevant, the more inclined
they are to scrutinize its message, and accordingly the less likely they are to rely on peripheral, symbolic elements.
Employing a survey experiment, I test this latter expectation in the empirical context of the Israeli Environmental
Protection Ministry and its policy regarding air pollution in a specific area—the Haifa Bay. The research sample
(N = 859) consists of citizens residing in the polluted area, matched with residents of other cities in the centre of the
country that are not exposed to high levels of air pollution. I present all participants with a policy plan regarding the
air pollution in the Haifa Bay area, while experimentally varying both its appearance (familiar symbolic elements from
the Ministry's communications versus two control groups) and substantive information (logically persuasive versus
unpersuasive policy plans). I examine the effects of these manipulations on participants' trust in the policy plan
across the two areas, and test the hypothesis that residents of the polluted area are less affected by symbolic brand
elements (and more affected by the differences in substantive arguments). I further supplement this observational
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comparison between the areas with an experimental treatment for the perceived personal relevance of the policy,
and with additional robustness tests.
Contrary to my expectations, the results consistently indicate that even high levels of perceived personal rele-
vance do not attenuate the effect of symbols on citizens' trust. These findings suggest that the boundaries of persua-
sion through branding are wider than expected. I discuss the theoretical and normative implications of these
findings.
2 | PERSUASION BY SYMBOLS AND ITS MODERATION BY PERCEIVED
PERSONAL RELEVANCE
A brand can be defined as ‘a symbolic construct that consists of a name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or combination
of these, created deliberately to identify a phenomenon and differentiate it from similar phenomena by adding par-
ticular meaning to it’ (Eshuis and Klijn 2012, p. 19). Branding, therefore, can be considered a form of symbolic com-
munication. In practice, symbolic elements that are strategically designed to evoke positive emotions and
associations can be found in almost every government communication with citizens.
Symbolic elements entangled in communications can affect citizens' attitudes through a psychological mecha-
nism of evaluative conditioning, whereby the positive associations triggered by the symbols are unconsciously trans-
ferred to the public organization (De Houwer 2012; Alon-Barkat and Gilad 2017). So for instance, when a public
organization uses a celebrity endorser in a public campaign, the positive connotations for the celebrity
(e.g., physically attractive, funny, talented) can be extended to the organization, which would lead citizens to also
view the organization and its actions more favourably. This mechanism is considered a primitive form of persuasion
which requires very little cognitive effort, as opposed to persuasion resulting from thoughtful consideration of sub-
stantive arguments. Thus, the question of under which circumstances are citizens more/less susceptible to persua-
sion via branding can be linked to a more general discussion in social psychology regarding the relations between
different psychological processes of persuasion through communication, and to the determinants and moderators of
these different processes.
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Briñol 2011), persua-
sion can occur via different processes that can be placed along an ‘elaboration continuum’. At the high end of that
continuum, also called the ‘central route’, persuasion occurs through processes that require high degrees of thought
and cognitive effort. This type of processing involves thoughtful scrutiny of arguments in the communication that
are central to the merits of the issue. People located at the high end are more likely to form their judgements on the
matter based on the quality of the arguments. They are more likely to differentiate between strong and weak argu-
ments, and would be persuaded mainly by strong, logically persuasive arguments. As for those who are located at
the low end of that continuum, or ‘peripheral route’, persuasion may occur mainly through processes that require
only a small amount of thinking, such as evaluative conditioning. Another prominent example for peripheral route
processing is people's reliance on message source as a heuristic cue (James and Van Ryzin 2017). When people are
located between the two ends of the continuum, a mixture of these persuasion processes will operate.
In any given situation, the position of people along that continuum (and accordingly the dominant type of
processing) would be determined by their motivation and ability to scrutinize the message. The more motivated peo-
ple are to elaborate on the message and the more capable they are of doing so, the more likely they are to focus on
the substantive arguments, and likewise the less susceptible they are to persuasion via peripheral route processes.
The ELM literature has pointed to a variety of factors that may shape people's motivation and ability to think about a
message, and that accordingly affect their inclination to be persuaded either by arguments or by peripheral cues. Per-
haps the most studied factor in this regard is the perceived personal relevance of the communication (or ‘issue
involvement’), namely the extent to which they perceive the issue at hand as having significant consequences for
their own lives. That variable has been considered the most important determinant of motivation to scrutinize the
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message (Petty et al. 2002; Petty and Briñol 2011).1 It has been theorized that the more people perceive an issue as
personally relevant, the more motivated they are to invest in thinking about it, since the consequences of being
incorrect are greater (Petty and Cacioppo 1979; Petty et al. 1981; Petty et al. 1983; Burnkrant and Unnava 1989).
Accordingly, experimental studies in marketing and social psychology have shown that individuals are more affected
by peripheral cues and less affected by argument quality the less they perceive the issue as personally relevant.
For instance, in a marketing study by Petty et al. (1983), participants were asked about their attitudes towards a
new disposable razor, after being exposed to a magazine ad. The ad involved either a celebrity endorser or a non-
famous endorser (a symbolic peripheral cue) and contained substantive information about the product that represen-
ted either strong or weak arguments about its quality. In addition, scholars manipulated the perceived personal rele-
vance of the product by telling subjects either that the product would soon be available in their local area (high
relevance), or that it would be available in other areas (low relevance). The results of the study indicated that the
celebrity endorser had a positive effect on participants' attitudes about the product under the low personal relevance
condition (estimated as roughly 0.7 SDs), but had no effect under the high personal relevance condition. Likewise,
the effect of argument quality was more than three times greater for the high personal relevance group.
Viewed against the above theoretical framework, symbolic brand elements in government communications can
be regarded as peripheral cues, which can affect citizens' attitudes through a peripheral route process of evaluative
conditioning. Hence, based on ELM, citizens' judgements about public organizations are less likely to be affected by
symbolic brand elements (and more likely to be shaped by substantive arguments) the more motivated they are to
critically think about the message. Citizens' level of motivation is likely to be determined, to a great extent, by the
degree to which they perceive the policy issue in the communication as having personal relevance for themselves.
In sum, I derive from the social psychology and marketing literatures the following moderation hypotheses:
H1: Symbolic elements in communications are likely to have a greater positive effect on citizens' atti-
tudes about government organizations and policies the lower the perceived personal relevance of the
communication.
H2: The argument quality of the information in communications is likely to have a weaker effect on
citizens' attitudes about government organizations and policies the lower the perceived personal rele-
vance of the communication.
3 | METHODOLOGY
The above-mentioned expectations are tested via a survey experiment, building on the methodology of Petty et al.
(1983). The experiment focuses empirically on the case of the Israeli Environmental Protection Ministry (hereafter:
EPM) and its policy for reducing air pollution in the highly polluted Haifa Bay area. In the following section, I describe
the empirical case, data collection, experimental design and operationalization of research variables.2
The experiment was also designed to test a set of hypotheses regarding the interaction between symbols and
information. In this article, I focus on those methodological and empirical parts of the study that are consequential
for examining the moderating role of personal relevance.3
3.1 | The empirical case
The EPM is a national-level bureau responsible for the formulation, coordination and execution of environmental
policy in Israel. Among other things, the EPM is responsible for monitoring and regulating air quality across the coun-
try. The Haifa Bay area, located in the north of Israel, has been characterized by relatively high levels of air pollution,
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mainly due to the Haifa Bay industrial zone, which is located in proximity to a number of urban residential areas. It is
considered the largest industrial zone in the country, with a concentration of petrochemical industries, including oil
refineries, power plants and chemical factories. Beginning in the mid-2000s, the EPM has been developing and
implementing a series of policy programmes to monitor and reduce the high levels of air pollution specifically in that
area (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2019). While the EPM has claimed that its programmes have been effec-
tive and have led to a significant reduction in air pollution levels, local residents, professionals and other public agen-
cies have remained greatly concerned about the issue, and accordingly it remained high on the public agenda (State
Comptroller of Israel 2019).
Specifically, the issue received much media and public attention in 2015–16, following a series of reports and
media publications about the health consequences of the air pollution to Haifa Bay residents. In 2015, the Ministry
of Health published statistical data indicating that Haifa Bay residents experience significantly higher rates of cancer
and asthma compared to other areas of the country. Thereafter, in 2016, media reporters revealed the interim results
of a large epidemiological study, establishing a link between air pollution in the Haifa Bay and certain types of cancer,
as well as abnormal measurements of newborn babies and growth curves of infants. The media reports of that study
repeatedly highlighted a particular finding that babies in the Haifa Bay are born with ‘smaller heads’ (e.g., Koriel
2016; Rivlin 2016). These publications, and others, caused much panic among the local population, and especially
among young parents.
The air pollution in the Haifa Bay offers an opportune case for examining the moderating role of perceived per-
sonal relevance. The distinction between those who reside in the polluted area and those who do not entails a natu-
ral variation in that moderating variable. Importantly, because this policy issue is intangible and scientifically
complicated, the variation in personal relevance is not strongly confounded with personal knowledge about the issue,
as is normally the case. Accordingly, those residing in the polluted Haifa Bay area are more motivated to scrutinize a
communication about the air pollution in their area, yet they are not necessarily more capable of critically evaluating
its content. That latter assumption was the main reason for selecting this case.
While comparing those residing in the Haifa Bay to others enables me to examine the moderating effect of per-
ceived personal relevance, it still has an important limitation—it represents an observational comparison. The differ-
ences in personal relevance can be theoretically confounded by unobserved covariates, which cannot be effectively
controlled in the analyses. I address this limitation in the research design in three main ways. First, in the selection of
the research population, I sought to reduce differences in socioeconomic and demographic variables between resi-
dents of Haifa Bay and their comparison group. Accordingly, I selected the major cities in the Haifa Bay area (Haifa,
Nesher, Qiryat-Hayiim, Qiryat-Bialik, Qiryat-Mozkin, Qiryat-Ata and Qiryat-Yam) and matched them with citizens
from cities with a similar profile and population size in the centre of the country (Natania, Petach-Tikva and Rishon-
Lezion).4 I further searched relevant EPM documents and news websites and confirmed that there were no reports
of high air pollution levels in the three centre cities.
Second, in addition to the policy regarding Haifa Bay air pollution, I included in the experiment a second policy plan
that is expected to be perceived by the two groups as equally relevant. For this purpose, I selected a policy plan of EPM
that regards reducing domestic waste and increasing recycling (henceforth: recycling policy). The comparison between the
two policies is intended to confirm that respondents' divergent responses to symbolic elements in the communication of
the Haifa Bay air pollution policy, if found, can only be attributed to differences in perceived personal relevance. Third, in
addition to the observational comparison between the two areas, I included an experimental manipulation aimed at
enhancing the perceived personal relevance of the air pollution policy among the Haifa Bay residents.
3.2 | Data collection and procedure
I was assisted by an Israeli internet research panel company iPanel for the selection and recruitment of residents of
these selected cities. The survey was conducted online through Qualtrics Survey Software, between 28 January and
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1 February 2018. A total of 1,101 respondents completed the survey (a response rate of 21.7 per cent). I further fil-
tered out 242 observations (22 per cent) due to the following criteria: multiple entries from the same IP address
(n = 32), failure in the instructional manipulation test (n = 125), submitting the survey in less than three or more than
30 minutes (n = 37), and reported age under 18 (n = 48). These filters are neither associated with the areas nor with
the experimental conditions. Following this screening, I ended up with a sizable analytical sample of 859 subjects, of
whom 496 live in the Haifa Bay cities, and 363 live in the centre cities.5
The survey was presented to the participants as an academic study about citizens' attitudes regarding environ-
mental policies in general. After a set of pre-manipulation questions, all subjects, regardless of their area of residence,
were randomly assigned to treatment or control conditions of perceived personal relevance (hereafter: relevance
manipulation). Subjects assigned to the relevance treatment were asked three questions about their perceptions of
environmental policy in general. They were then asked to state their area and locality of residence, and to describe,
in their own words, the most disturbing environmental issue in their area. These questions were designed to prime
those residing in the Haifa Bay to think about the personal relevance of air pollution in their area. Subjects in the rel-
evance control group were asked equivalent questions about their field of occupation.
Participants were then presented with the two policy plans (Haifa Bay air pollution and recycling), displayed in
random order. They were informed that these plans were obtained from the EPM's annual work plan for the follow-
ing year. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions of symbolic elements in the communi-
cation (hereafter: symbols manipulation): treatment-‘real symbols’, control-‘no symbols’ and control-‘fake symbols’. In
the real symbols condition, the two policies are displayed with three symbolic brand elements, which have been used
in the EPM's public communications and became widely recognized by the public.
The first symbolic element is the unique brand logo of the EPM, which consists of a pair of green and orange
leaves that resemble two hands, designed to symbolize peace and harmony with the environment. The second ele-
ment is the green colour, which is strongly associated with taking care of the environment. The third element is the
images of celebrity comedians from advertising campaigns of the EPM. The Haifa Bay air pollution policy (in the real
symbols condition) was presented with an image from the EPM campaign from 2010 under the slogan ‘starting to
think green’, starring the Israeli celebrity comedian Tal Friedman. The recycling policy was presented with an image
from a campaign from 2017 for reducing the use of disposable bags (‘taking every bag seriously’), starring the come-
dian Ido Rosenblum. In the control no-symbols condition, the two policies are displayed in a minimal black and white
design, and without the logo and the celebrities' images. Finally, in the control fake-symbols condition, the EPM logo
is replaced by a fake logo, the green colour is replaced with blue, and the images of celebrities from the campaigns
are replaced with edited images of unfamiliar people. The purpose of the fake-logo condition was to distinguish the
effect of the symbolic meaning of the EPM's graphic brand elements from a possible effect of their aesthetic design.
Accordingly, I specifically designed the ‘fake’ symbols so that they would resemble the real symbols and have equiva-
lent aesthetic qualities, without activating particular emotions and associations related to the EPM, or environmental
policy. Hence, these elements can also be regarded as peripheral cues, yet they do not represent familiar brand sym-
bols of the EPM. The symbols conditions are displayed in appendix A. Further details about the real and fake symbols
are found in the supplementary appendix (section 2).
In addition, I included a manipulation of the argument quality of the information in the communication about the
policy plan (hereafter: information manipulation). Per each policy, subjects were randomly allocated to one of two
conditions of information: strong policy (i.e., logically persuasive policy plan) or weak policy (i.e., logically
unpersuasive). Each subject was exposed to two policy plans, one strong and one weak, displayed in a random order.
Each policy plan included the title of the policy goal, followed by short descriptions of two actions to be taken by the
EPM to fulfil this goal. The actions mentioned in the strong policy plan condition were taken from the EPM's real
work plan and from other official sources, whereas those in the weak policy plan were fictional, and deliberately
designed to create a poor policy plan, which is incompatible with achieving the policy goals. For instance, the pro-
posed actions for the strong Haifa Bay air pollution policy involved increasing the supervision of polluting factories,
and reducing diesel smoke emissions by vehicles, whereas the actions for the weak policy were to decrease the
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supervision of polluting factories, and raise citizens' awareness of the Ministry's efforts to improve air quality. The
full texts of the weak and strong conditions for the two policy plans are found in the supplementary appendix
(section 3).
Each policy plan was followed by six questions about respondents' trust in the policy. After the trust questions
of the second policy, the subjects were asked additional questions about the two policies, including the degree to
which they perceive each of them as personally relevant. These questions were followed by an instructional manipu-
lation check item, intended to assess participants' diligence. The last sections included a set of demographic ques-
tions, questions about their place of residence and work, and manipulation checks for participants' familiarity with
the real symbols. At the end of the survey, the participants were briefed about the manipulations, and the possible
deception.
In line with the above-mentioned hypotheses, my main focus in this article is on participants' trust in the Haifa
Bay air pollution policy, and the two-way interactions between residence in Haifa Bay and the symbols and informa-
tion manipulations of that policy. I also explore these interactions with regard to the recycling policy, and compare
them to the air pollution interactions. In addition, within the Haifa Bay sample, I examine the two-way interactions
between the relevance manipulation and the symbols and information manipulations.
I conducted power estimations for the main effects of the symbols and information manipulations, their condi-
tional effects within each area and the aforementioned interactions. I conducted these estimations after the data col-
lection and analyses, based on the analytical sample size. The detectable (power = .8) interaction coefficient between
areas and the real symbols treatment is estimated as 0.27 SDs, and between areas and weak information manipula-
tion is estimated as 0.23 SDs. As for the interactions with the relevance manipulation, the detectable coefficients of
their interactions with the symbols and information conditions among Haifa Bay respondents are estimated as 0.36
and 0.29 SDs, respectively. These power estimations are reported in detail in the supplementary appendix
(section 5).
3.3 | Variables
The outcome variable, citizens' trust in policy, is measured in the survey using a composite index of six items
(Cronbach's alpha = .93). This scale was adopted with modifications from validated trust scales used in previous pub-
lic administration studies (Karens et al. 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies 2017). Participants were asked to indicate
their agreement with the following statements, between 1 (weakly agree) and 7 (strongly agree): (1) I believe that the
actions mentioned in the policy plan will assist in fulfilling the policy goal; (2) I believe that the actions mentioned in
the policy plan were designed in a professional manner; (3) I believe that the policy plan is in the interest of citizens;
(4) I believe that the policy plan reflects a genuine attempt to improve the well-being of citizens; (5) I believe that the
EPM made an honest attempt to design a good policy plan; (6) I believe that the Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion aims to keep its commitments in that policy plan.
The key independent variables are the manipulations of symbols and information in the communication, as
described above, and their interactions with the perceived personal relevance of the communication. The latter is
operationalized observationally (through the distinction between the two areas) as well as experimentally (through
the relevance manipulation).
Living in the Haifa Bay area was coded according to respondents' reporting of residence, work or studying in
one of the Haifa Bay cities. To confirm the empirical assumption that the Haifa Bay air pollution policy (but not the
recycling policy) is perceived as more personally relevant by Haifa Bay residents compared with centre residents,
respondents were asked, after the outcome variable items: ‘To what extent did you feel that the policy on … is per-
sonally relevant to you?’ (1 = ‘very little’; 7 = ‘very much’). Figure 1 shows the distributions of the latter items across
the two areas. As expected, the Haifa Bay air pollution policy is perceived as more personally relevant by the local
residents compared with those residing in the centre (Cohen's d = 1.73 [1.57,1.89]). The recycling policy is perceived
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by both groups as relatively personally relevant, with no statistically significant differences. Additional support for
these differences is provided by respondents' answers to the open question presented to the relevance treatment
group about the most salient environmental issue in their area of residence. Indeed, 176 of the 263 Haifa Bay sub-
jects who were asked this question referred in their responses to the air pollution generated from the industrial area
(67 per cent),6 and many of them explicitly linked it to higher morbidity rates in their area. Subjects from centre cities
referred to a variety of issues, including recycling, traffic jams and cleanliness, and only 8 per cent of them mentioned
air pollution as a prominent environmental concern in their area.
As for the relevance manipulation, data suggest that assignment to relevance priming questions did not increase
Haifa Bay respondents' perceptions of personal relevance of the air pollution policy. The Haifa Bay participants
assigned to the treatment group reported a slightly lower level of personal relevance on average, yet these differ-
ences are not statistically significant (Cohen's d = .14 [−.03,.32], t = 1.61, p = .108). This limitation should be kept in
mind when interpreting the results regarding this manipulation.
The results of all manipulation and validation checks are available in the supplementary appendix, along with
summary statistics and a correlation matrix for all variables (sections 4, 6).
4 | RESULTS
I begin by examining the random assignment to the different experimental conditions. Table 1 provides a comparison
between the different conditions, within each of the two areas, on demographic variables and pre-manipulation
covariates. These comparisons confirm that these random assignments yielded fairly balanced groups.7 The table fur-
ther suggests that the samples of Haifa Bay and centre residents are fairly balanced with regard to gender, trust in
national-level government ministries and interest in environmental issues. Yet, Haifa Bay respondents are somewhat
older, more educated, and have a more left-wing ideology.
I now turn to exploring the main outcome variable of interest—respondents' trust in the Haifa Bay air pollution
policy. This outcome variable has a right-skewed distribution (Mean = 3.95, SD = 1.54, Median = 4), which entails
that more subjects reported very low levels of trust than very high levels of trust in the policy. Figure 2 shows the
means and distributions of the outcome variable across the different experimental conditions of symbolic elements
and information, and across the two areas. The real symbols condition (in the left panel) has a positive and significant
main effect on trust in that policy plan compared with the no symbols condition (diff = .41 [.16,.67], t = 3.197). That
effect amounts to 0.27 SDs [0.1,0.43]. Subjects who saw the real symbols also reported, on average, greater trust in
F IGURE 1 Perceived personal relevance of policy issues across areas
Note: In all figures, points and error bars represent means and 95 per cent confidence intervals
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the policy, compared with those who received fake symbols, yet these differences are not significant at the 95 per
cent level (diff = .16 [−.08,.41], t = 1.307, p = .192). The increase in the lower bound of the box in the real symbols
shows that real symbols reduced to a great extent the number of participants who reported a very low trust score.
Descriptively, 21 per cent of the participants in the no symbols group reported a score of 2 or less which indicates a
very low level of trust, compared with 15 per cent and only 11 per cent in the real symbols group. As shown in the
middle panel, the main effect of the weak information condition is negative and significant (diff = .75 [.95,.55],
t = 7.338). That effect amounts to 0.49 SDs [0.36,0.62].
Finally, as presented in the right panel, participants from Haifa Bay reported significantly lower levels of trust in
the Haifa Bay air pollution policy, compared to centre participants (diff = .59 [.38,.79], t = 5.67). Descriptively, 51 per
cent of Haifa Bay subjects have a trust-index score lower than 4, the scale's middle point (compared with 34 per cent
of the centre subjects). This indicates that the majority of the sampled Haifa Bay residents tend to have prior nega-
tive attitudes towards the EPM's actions regarding air pollution in their area.
Next, I examine the interactions between the symbols and information manipulation, and the two areas. To reit-
erate, based on my theoretical hypotheses, I expect that subjects living in the Haifa Bay, who perceive this issue as
personally relevant, would be less affected by the symbolic elements, compared with those living in the Centre (H1).
F IGURE 2 Main effects
F IGURE 3 The effects of symbolic elements and information on trust across areas
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Likewise, I expect Haifa Bay respondents to be more affected by the differences in the argument quality of the com-
munication (strong versus weak information), compared with centre respondents (H2).
Figure 3 graphically illustrates the conditional effects of the manipulations, within each of the two areas. As for
the effect of the symbols manipulation (displayed in the left panel), the results show that the symbols had a greater
effect on those living in the polluted Haifa Bay area, and not smaller as expected. Their exposure to the real symbols
increased their trust in the policy by 0.39 SDs [0.18,0.61] compared with the no symbols group, and 0.19 SDs
[0.03,0.4] compared to the fake symbols group. The centre participants who saw the real symbols also reported, on
average, higher levels of trust in the policy, compared with the two control groups. However, these differences were
smaller and not sufficiently significant. The effect of the information manipulation (displayed in the right panel) was
roughly similar in both groups.
These results are at odds with the initial theoretical expectations. They suggest that those residing in the pol-
luted area were equally, and perhaps even more, likely to be influenced by symbolic elements in the communication
(and to a lesser extent, by the unfamiliar graphical elements). Similarly, these analyses do not provide evidence that
Haifa Bay residents were more likely than others to scrutinize the communication, and differentiate between strong
and weak arguments.
TABLE 2 Regression analyses—Trust in Haifa Bay air pollution policy
Trust in Haifa Bay air pollution policy
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Real symbols .431 .001 .438 <.001 .633 <.001 .579 <.001
(.126) (.123) (.162) (.153)
Fake symbols .251 .045 .241 .050 .388 .018 .367 .018
(.126) (.124) (.168) (.160)
Weak information −.756 <.001 −.725 .000 −.699 <.001 −.770 <.001
(.102) (.100) (.135) (.128)
Area (0 = Haifa Bay; 1 = centre) .546 <.001 .866 <.001 .832 <.001
(.100) (.204) (.189)
Area × Real symbols −.470 .061 −.453 .054
(.250) (.235)
Area × Fake symbols −.355 .155 −.435 .064
(.249) (.233)
Area ×Weak information −.082 .688 −.057 .767
(.203) (.192)
Constant 4.094 <.001 3.849 <.001 3.719 <.001 3.411 <.001
(.103) (.109) (.129) (.299)
Controls No No No Yes
F-statistic 22.62 26.15 15.86 20.13
N 859 859 859 828
Adjusted R2 .069 .099 .100 .233
Notes: In all regression tables, entries are nonstandardized OLS-regression coefficients. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses and p-values (two-tailed) are reported. The reference category for the symbols manipulation conditions is the
control (no symbols).
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I further examined the interactions between the manipulations and the two areas via a series of multiple linear
regression models, presented in Table 2. In model 1.1, I regress trust in Haifa Bay air pollution policy on the manipu-
lations, then I add the areas and the interaction between them (models 1.2, 1.3). In model 1.4, I test the robustness
of the interaction model by controlling for individual-level covariates.8 In all regression models, I use robust standard
errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity.9 The results of these models are largely consistent with the raw findings pres-
ented above. In models 1.3 and 1.4 the interactions between living in the centre and the real symbols are negative
and significant at the 90 per cent level, and the interactions with the weak information are insignificant. A compari-
son between models 1.2 and 1.3 via ANOVA reveals that adding these interactions does not significantly improve
the model fit (F(3) = 1.33, p = .26).
In summary, the findings with regard to the Haifa Bay air pollution policy indicate, tentatively, that higher levels
of perceived personal relevance of the communication neither attenuate the positive effect of brand elements
entangled in communications, nor enhance citizens' attention to their substantive content. As discussed in the meth-
odology section, this analysis is based on an observational comparison, and hence a concern of endogeneity cannot
be entirely ruled out. Accordingly, the null findings regarding the interactions between the areas and the manipula-
tions can be the result of other, unobserved differences between the two populations. Yet, as explained, the experi-
mental design provides two additional tests which enable this concern to be addressed: the comparison to the
recycling policy, for which there are no relevance differences between the two areas, and the relevance manipula-
tion. I now discuss the results of these two tests.
TABLE 3 Regression analyses—Trust in recycling policy
Trust in recycling policy
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Real symbols .298 .008 .300 .007 .539 <.001 .536 <.001
(.112) (.112) (.145) (.136)
Fake symbols .192 .085 .188 .090 .433 .004 .446 .002
(.113) (.112) (.148) (.138)
Weak information −.421 <.001 −.432 <.001 −.398 .001 −.320 .005
(.090) (.090) (.117) (.109)
Area (0 = Haifa Bay; 1 = centre) .208 .023 .617 .001 .677 <.001
(.092) (.185) (.172)
Area × Real symbols −.571 .012 −.571 .007
(.226) (.213)
Area × Fake symbols −.568 .012 −.661 .002
(.227) (.208)
Area ×Weak information −.042 .817 −.082 .635
(.185) (.173)
Constant 4.549 <.001 4.468 <.001 4.286 <.001 3.060 <.001
(.093) (.098) (.121) (.253)
Controls No No No Yes
F-statistic 9.67 8.11 5.85 16.6
N 859 859 859 828
Adjusted R2 .030 .035 .041 .195
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Table 3 replicates the above models for trust in the recycling policy. Overall, these models reveal relatively simi-
lar patterns to those found in the air pollution policy. Notice that Haifa Bay subjects reported lower trust on that pol-
icy as well, which may indicate that their negative perceptions about the Ministry's actions regarding air pollution in
their area shapes their general perceptions of the organization. The directions of the simple effects and interaction
terms remain intact, while the main effects and conditional effects are smaller and less significant.10 Consistent with
the air pollution policy, Haifa Bay subjects were more affected by the symbols, and the two areas responded similarly
to the differences in the information. The fact that similar patterns are observed across these policies further
weakens the hypotheses regarding the moderating role of personal relevance. It also rules out a possible argument
that greater relevance enhances (rather than reduces) the effect of symbols. If this was the case, then we should not
have found a similar interaction in relation to the recycling policy.
Next, Table 4 presents the two-way interactions between the relevance manipulation and the symbols and infor-
mation manipulations. All models are restricted to Haifa Bay residents. In model 3.1, I regress trust in Haifa Bay air
pollution policy on the three manipulations, then in model 3.2, I add the two-way interactions, and in model 3.3 I add
controls. In all these models, the coefficients of the relevance treatment are negative but far from significant. The
interactions between the real symbols and the relevance manipulation are negative, which indicates that among
those who were primed to think about the personal relevance of the air pollution problem, the increase in trust due
to the appearance of the familiar symbols was slightly smaller. However, these interaction coefficients are far from
significant and relatively weak. The interactions between the relevance treatment and weak information
TABLE 4 Regression analyses—Experimental manipulation of perceived personal relevance
Trust in Haifa Bay air pollution policy
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3)
p-value p-value p-value
Real symbols .633 <.001 .704 .005 .690 .004
(.162) (.227) (.224)
Fake symbols .385 .023 .337 .169 .306 .191
(.169) (.226) (.226)
Weak information −.699 <.001 −.831 <.001 −.935 <.001
(.135) (.186) (.184)
Relevance treatment −.064 .639 −.173 .526 −.293 .254
(.135) (.256) (.232)
Relevance treatment × Real symbols −.127 .704 −.173 .586
(.323) (.306)
Relevance treatment × Fake symbols .086 .799 .103 .747
(.335) (.325)
Relevance treatment ×Weak information .242 .376 .301 .247
(.270) (.256)
Constant 3.753 3.814 3.534
(.146) (.171) (.422)
Controls No No Yes
F-statistic 10.49 6.19 10.65
N 496 496 474
Adjusted R2 .068 .064 .209
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manipulations are also in the expected direction, but again insignificant.11 Hence, these analyses also do not lend suf-
ficient support for the hypotheses.
Two limitations about these latter analyses should be acknowledged. First, since the treatment manipulation did
not affect participants' self-reporting of the personal relevance, there is no certainty that the manipulation actually
succeeded in modifying the perceptions of those subjects. Second, these analyses have more limited statistical
power, compared to the observational comparisons, since they are restricted only to the sample of Haifa Bay sub-
jects. Still, based on the interactions in model 3.2, we can assess that even if the relevance manipulation does attenu-
ate the effect of the real symbols, their effect on that group compared with the no symbols can be estimated as 0.37
SDs [0.08,0.659]. Remarkably, even when restricting the relevance treatment group to those who mentioned the air
pollution as an acute environmental issue in their area of residence (67 per cent of that group, n = 176), the real sym-
bols still had a roughly similar positive effect on trust in the policy plan, compared with the no symbols (diff = .61
[.05–1.17], t = 2.167). Overall, the data indicate that even Haifa Bay residents that were reminded about the rele-
vance of the air pollution were positively affected by familiar symbols of the ministry, at least to some degree.
Finally, I further explore the robustness of these findings through additional analyses, reported in the supple-
mentary appendix (section 8). First, I replicate the main models while restricting the analyses to the first policy seen
by the participants. This enables me to rule out the possibility that subjects' responses are affected by the manipula-
tions in the first policy presented to them (a carryover effect), or by their evaluation of it (assimilation or contrast
effects). Second, I restrict the analyses to Haifa Bay residents, and compare between those who are more/less likely
to perceive the air pollution as personally relevant, based on two proxies: (a) subjects' city of residence, and its geo-
graphical proximity to the polluting industrial area; (b) parents of young children. Third, I replicate the analyses on
the unfiltered sample. All these additional analyses are largely consistent with the analyses presented in the article,
and do not provide evidence that greater levels of perceived personal relevance attenuate the effect of symbols.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study contributes to the growing public administration research on government branding and its potency to
influence and possibly manipulate citizens' perceptions of government organizations and their policies and services. I
explored whether persuasion through branding can also occur in policy matters that have significant, clear implica-
tions for citizens' well-being. I examined the hypothesis, derived from social psychology theory, that the effect of
familiar symbolic elements in communications is attenuated the more citizens perceive the communication as per-
sonally relevant. I put this hypothesis to rigorous empirical testing using a survey experiment focused on air pollution
policy, utilizing a natural variation in perceived personal relevance. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
study to explore the moderating role of perceived personal relevance on citizens' responses to government branding,
and to public communications at large.
Contrary to my expectations, and those of extant research in social psychology and marketing, I did not find that
higher levels of perceived personal relevance attenuate the effect of symbols. While subjects residing in the polluted
Haifa Bay reported in the survey that they perceive the governmental policy for reducing air pollution in that area as
highly relevant for their lives, they were similarly, and perhaps even more, affected by the appearance of familiar
brand elements in the communication of that policy plan. Furthermore, I find that even priming Haifa Bay residents
to think about the personal relevance of the air pollution did not significantly attenuate their susceptibility to persua-
sion by the symbols.
How can we reconcile the findings of this study with the proposed theory? One plausible explanation is that
despite the relatively high involvement of Haifa Bay residents, they were still not motivated enough to rely only on
the central route and disregard the peripheral cues. If this explanation holds, it entails that citizens may resist the
emotional effect of symbols perhaps only in rare circumstances, which are characterized by extremely high levels of
personal relevance—policies that have immediate, tangible and unambiguous consequences for citizens' well-being.
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Indeed, previous ELM scholars have acknowledged that the extreme personal relevance conditions generated in
experimental settings can rarely be found in the world outside the laboratory (Petty and Cacioppo 1986, p. 206).
How can we explain the finding that the positive effect of the real symbols was stronger to some extent among
Haifa Bay residents? Given that this pattern is also evident for the recycling policy, it is unlikely that it is linked to dif-
ferences in perceived personal relevance. Rather, I tentatively suggest two other possible explanations. First, these
patterns could be the result of the higher intercept of centre residents' trust in EPM policies, or a ceiling effect. More
generally, it could be the case that symbolic elements are more effective in shifting people from low to medium
levels of trust (i.e., as in the case of Haifa Bay subjects), than shifting them from medium to high levels (i.e., as in the
case of centre subjects, and the recycling policy). In other words, symbols may be more effective in reducing citizens'
distrust, than increasing their trust.12
A second explanation could be that EPM symbols attenuated the effect of Haifa Bay residents' negative prior
beliefs on their judgements of the policy plans. Accordingly, there could be an interaction between the emotive
effect of symbols and citizens' prior positions embedded in their group affiliation and social identities (in our case,
the local identity of Haifa Bay residents). I theorize, tentatively, that the direction of the interaction depends on
whether or not the symbolic associations are related to the relevant group identities. When the symbols are not
strongly linked to identities of specific groups having strong prior positions on the policy or the organization, as in
this case, symbols would attenuate the influence of the prior beliefs on people's judgements. Conversely, when sym-
bolic associations activate group identities and make them more salient, they may enhance the effect of dominant
positions embedded in them, and increase polarization between parties (Teodoro and An 2018). Hence, future
research may further examine the interactions between different types of symbols and citizens' prior beliefs and
group identities.
Still, several limitations of this study should be acknowledged. The study focuses on environmental policy, and
on a specific issue—air pollution in a specific area. Future studies may put these findings to further test by exploring
cases of air pollution in other locations, as well as by exploring cases of other environmental policies, and other
domains. In addition, future studies may conduct more rigorous comparisons between different levels of personal
relevance through natural experimental or quasi-experimental designs. Finally, although this study includes an experi-
mental manipulation for perceived personal relevance, I acknowledge the limitations of that test, namely its statistical
power and the fact that the manipulation checks do not validate the effectiveness of the manipulation. Therefore,
future studies may explore alternative approaches for manipulating this variable.
The results of this study, if generalizable, have significant implications. They suggest that citizens are susceptible
to persuasion by government branding and symbolic communication, even with regard to salient, contested policy
issues that have significant consequences for their own lives. Accordingly, these findings suggest that the boundaries
of persuasion via branding are much wider than expected. This entails that public organizations can affect and
manipulate citizens' perceptions in a broad array of policy domains and contexts by investing in branding. Alongside
the benefits of this instrument in mitigating citizens' distrust, it also has the potency to yield a distorted, emotive,
overoptimistic view of government organizations and their policies, which may undermine basic democratic account-
ability mechanisms. These concerns become even more prevalent and serious in the age of digital communication
and artificial intelligence technologies, which enable organizations to engage with targeted audiences more easily,
and to adapt messages and symbols to groups and individuals in a manner that would trigger their emotional
responses more effectively. For good or for ill, citizens are affected by the emotional connections and associations of
symbols.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank, first and foremost, my doctoral advisor, Sharon Gilad. I also thank Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Lilach Nir, Omer
Yair, Sebastian Jilke, Joris van der Voet, Guy Freedman, the graduate students of the Hebrew University's Political
Science department, and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions and comments. Furthermore, I
thank my multiple friends and acquaintances from the Haifa Bay, who helped me to better understand the residents'
16 ALON-BARKAT
point of view. Finally, I thank Yarden Alon for her assistance in the research. I am grateful to the Azrieli Foundation
for the award of an Azrieli Fellowship.
ORCID
Saar Alon-Barkat https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3342-0568
ENDNOTES
1 For a thorough review of motivational and ability factors affecting likelihood to elaborate see Petty and Wegener (1998).
2 The full survey and summary statistics of all variables are available in the supplementary appendix. Replication materials
are available at: https://github.com/saaralonbarkat/SVIVA_2018.
3 The methodological aspects which are relevant for examining the additional hypotheses are described in Alon-Barkat
(2019).
4 The socioeconomic characteristics of these selected cities are summarized in the supplementary appendix (section 1).
5 In the supplementary appendix (section 8), I replicate the main models on the unfiltered sample, with no significant
change to the results.
6 I coded any reference to either air pollution or the chemical factories in the Haifa Bay area, as related to air pollution. To
confirm inter-coder reliability, a second coder independently coded 70 observations (Krippendorff's alpha = .84).
7 Within the centre respondents, there were statistically significant differences between the symbols groups: regarding
education levels and the percentage of parents; and between the information groups: regarding the percentage of par-
ents of young children.
8 I control for all the variables that are included in the balancing tables, except for interest in environmental issues, which
was reported by only half of the sample. In other analyses, I also included that variable, with no significant change to the
main results.
9 Breusch-Pagan test confirms the presence of heteroskedasticity (for model 1.3, Breusch-Pagan test = 22.204, p = .002).
Robust standard errors are estimated using R sandwich package with estimation type ‘HC1’.
10 The weaker effect of the real symbols can be partly explained by the fact that I used a different celebrity campaign image
for the recycling policy, which was less familiar compared with the image presented for the Haifa Bay air pollution policy.
11 In additional analyses, I also examine the moderating effect of the relevance treatment for the recycling policy, and for
centre subjects' responses to the air pollution policy. The interactions with the relevance treatment are insignificant.
12 This explanation is supported by the comparison of the percentages of subjects who reported very low levels of trust in
the two policies. In the Haifa Bay, the percentage of those who reported a trust score of less than 2 in the air pollution
policy decreased from 18 per cent in the no symbols group to 13 per cent in the real symbols. Among the centre subjects,
only 11 per cent of the no symbols group reported a trust score lower than 2 in the no symbols, and this percentage
dropped to 6 per cent among the real symbols group.
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